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Abstract  
To investigate the format of mental images and the penetrability of mental imagery 
performance to top-down influences in the form of gravity information, children (4-, 6-, 8- 
and 10-year-olds) and adults (N = 112) performed mental rotation tasks. A linear increase in 
response time with rotation angle emerged at 6-years, suggesting that spatial properties are 
represented in children’s mental images. Moreover, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, but not 4-year-
olds or adults, took longer to respond to rotated stimuli pairs when gravity information was 
incongruent with the direction of rotation rather than congruent. Overall, findings suggest that 
in contrast to adults’, 6- to 10-year-olds’ mental rotation performance was penetrated by top-
down information. This research a) provides insight into the format of young children’s 
mental images and b) shows that children’s mental rotation performance is penetrable by top-
down influences. 
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Research with adults in mental imagery over the last 30 years has revealed that our 
images are depictive representations that preserve metric qualities such as space and distance 
(e.g., Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2003).  
Support for this depictive account comes from mental rotation tasks, whereby 
participants judge whether pairs of objects are the same or mirror images of one another 
when one of the pair is rotated to different degrees. A key finding is that response times 
increase linearly with increasing difference in rotation angle between objects (Shepard & 
Metzler, 1971). Such findings demonstrate that mental images incorporate the spatial 
information present in the original object; whole patterns are mentally rotated until aligned in 
orientation of the other object, and patterns possess a structure similar to representations that 
arise from perception (Kosslyn et al., 2003). This linear increase in rotation time with angle is 
already evident in 5-and 6-year-old children (Estes, 1998; Frick, Daum, Walser, & Mast, 
2009; Kosslyn, Margolis, Barrett, Goldknopf, & Daly, 1990; Marmor, 1975), indicating a 
depictive format of children’s mental images.  
However, it has also been shown that mental images are susceptible to top-down 
influences, and are thus cognitively penetrable: visual perceptual and mental experiences can 
vary as a function of participants’ beliefs, expectations, and knowledge (Pylyshyn, 2002; 
Kosslyn et al., 2003). In visual perception, adults and children are more likely to perceive 
alternative interpretations of ambiguous figures when they have knowledge of ambiguity 
(Doherty & Wimmer, 2005; Gregory, 2009; Wimmer & Doherty, 2011). Similarly, in mental 
imagery adults can reverse between alternative interpretations of ambiguous figures when 
cues are provided (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & Glisky, 1992). Thus, 
evidence shows that adults’ mental images are depictive in format (Kosslyn et al., 2003) but 
also cognitively penetrable by top-down information (Mast & Kosslyn, 2002; Peterson, et al., 
1992). However a fundamental question remains whether the mental depiction of visual 
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information can be penetrated by top-down knowledge in children. Surprisingly little is 
known about conceptual penetrability of children’s mental imagery, and of mental rotation 
processes in particular.  
To date, there is evidence of penetrability of mental rotation processes by motor 
processes in children and adults. Specifically, both children and adults take longer to 
mentally rotate kinetic stimuli when they are incongruent with motoric components (such as 
hand movements) compared to when they are congruent (Funk, Brugger, & Wilkening, 2005; 
Ionta, Fourkas, Fiorio, & Aglioti, 2007; Parsons, 1994). These types of mental rotation 
processes become increasingly differentiated from motor processes with increasing age (Frick 
et al., 2009; Funk, et al., 2005). In contrast to 11-year-olds and adults, 5- and 8-year-olds are 
faster at responding to rotated stimuli when a manual rotation of their hands is in line with the 
stimulus rotation direction, rather than in reverse (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005). Thus, 
findings indicate that young children’s kinetic mental rotation processes are guided to a larger 
extent by motor processes than adults (see Kosslyn, Ganis, & Thompson, 2001; Kosslyn, 
Digirolamo, Thompson, & Alpert, 1998 for neuroimaging evidence supporting the role of 
motor processes in kinetic rotation in adults). Together with findings that children’s visual 
perceptual processes are penetrated by top-down influences (Wimmer & Doherty, 2011), one 
would predict that children’s mental rotation processes may also be influenced by top-down 
processes and possibly to a larger extent than adults’ (Funk et al., 2005).  
The aim of the present research was two-fold. First, to examine further whether young 
children’s mental images are depictive in nature, we assessed whether children show the 
typical linear increase in mental rotation response times with angle. This provides insight into 
the format of their images. Second, we asked whether children’s and adults’ mental rotation 
performance is penetrable by top-down information. If children preserve spatial properties in 
their mental images and their rotation is influenced by top-down factors then this suggests 
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that children’s mental images are pictorial in nature and that performance can be penetrated 
by conceptual factors. Further, if the differentiation of mental rotation processes from motor 
processes previously reported (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005) reflects development of 
imagery processes per se, then one would also predict less top-down influence on mental 
rotation processes with increasing age.    
To manipulate top-down conceptual information, we used stimuli of a monkey 
standing on a table with one leg that was shorter than the other, suggesting that table and 
monkey would fall in the direction towards the shorter leg. This was either congruent or 
incongruent with the direction of the rotated stimulus. Using this top-down information 
required basic knowledge of gravity. Previous work has shown that 4-year-olds are around 
90% and 60% correct at judging from photographs whether an abstract symmetrical/ 
asymmetrical (respectively) object would fall off a partially supporting block (Krist, 2010); 
that children as young as 3 years of age are sensitive to gravity (Kim & Spelke, 1999); and 
41/2-months-olds have “intuition” about physical support (Needham & Baillargeon, 1993). 
Thus, the present task should pose no difficulties in conceptual understanding for 4-year-olds. 
Nevertheless, we checked children’s understanding at the end of the task.  
If children’s mental images are pictorial in nature, then they should demonstrate a 
linear increase in response times with increasing rotation angles. If children’s and adults’ 
mental images are penetrated by top-down conceptual information about gravity then they 
should be faster in the congruent trials (table falling in the same direction as the rotated 
monkey) than in incongruent trials (table falling in the opposite direction).  
Method 
Participants 
Overall 112 participants participated. Eighty-eight were children [17 4-year-olds (M = 
4.46 years, range = 4.05-5.03; 13 male, 4 female), 31 6-year-olds (M = 6.38 years, range = 
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6.04-7.05; 19 male, 12 female), 16 8-year-olds (M = 8.32 years, range = 8.05-9.04; 9 male, 7 
female), 24 10-year-olds (M = 10.39 years, range = 10.00-11.05; 10 male, 14 female)]; 24 
were adults (M = 21.46 years, range = 18-46; 4 male, 20 female). Children were recruited 
from two primary schools and predominately White, middle class. Adults were students 
recruited from the university's online participation system and participated for course credit. 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were seen in a quiet area outside the classroom (children) or at the 
university laboratory (adults). Tasks were computerized and presented on a 17.3 inch laptop 
PC running with the program Visual Basic that recorded the two dependent measures: (i) 
correctness and (ii) time taken to respond (reaction time from stimulus onset to button press).  
The images used throughout were taken from the monkey pairs from Estes (1998) 
which were adapted by adding extra stimuli. Participants’ task was to judge whether two 
monkeys appearing next to each other held up the same or different arms. The monkey on the 
left hand side was always upright and stood on a table with one leg cut off (see Figure 1). 
There were two different table versions: Either the monkey looked likely to fall to the right 
(congruent: towards the rotated monkey on the right hand side) or the monkey looked likely 
to fall to the left (incongruent: away from the rotated monkey on the right hand side). The 
monkey on the right hand side was shown in 7 different rotation angles, from 0° to 180° at 
30° increments. Both stimuli remained in view, so no memory assessment or control 
condition was required.  
(Figure 1 about here) 
There were 56 stimulus pairs: Half of them were “same” pairs (right arm-right 
arm/left arm-left arm) and half were “different” pairs (right arm-left arm/left arm-right arm). 
Half of the pairs appeared in a congruent fashion (monkey standing on a table that looked as 
if it would fall towards the direction of the rotated monkey) and half in an incongruent 
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fashion (monkey standing on a table that looked as if it would fall away from the direction of 
the rotated monkey).  
Children were shown half the stimuli (28) to ensure concentration throughout the 
experiment. Children saw one “congruent same” (either right-right arm or left-left arm), one 
"incongruent same" (either right-right or left-left), one "congruent different" (either right-left 
or left-right) and one "incongruent different" pair (either right-left or left-right), each in seven 
rotation angles (0˚-180˚). Adults were shown all 56 stimuli, for example, both “incongruent 
same” right-right and left-left, and so forth. 
The task was to judge whether monkeys held up the same or different arms. 
Participants received four practice trials, containing first one “same” and one “different” 
monkey-pair (without the table) at 0˚ and then one “same” and one “different” pair at 30˚. 
Practice was repeated if participants did not understand the task or answered more than one 
trial incorrectly. After a maximum of two repetitions all participants answered all practice 
trials correctly. In the test trials adults pressed the 'S' for same and 'D' for different keys, 
indicating whether the monkeys held up the same or different arms. Children either said 
“same” or “different” and the naïve experimenter was instructed to look at the children and 
pressed the appropriate response button for them. This minimised working memory demands 
and avoided the known risk of interference between button presses and imagery processes 
(Kail, 1988; 1991).  
After the test trials, children were asked in which direction the monkey on the table 
would fall. Only one 4-year-old answered incorrectly that the monkey on the table would fall 
in the direction of the longer leg. He was excluded from the analysis of the direction of the 
fall.  
Results 
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Table 1 shows mean accuracy and response times for each direction condition 
(congruent vs. incongruent). Figure 2 shows mean response times on trials with accurate 
responses for each rotation angle and direction condition across age groups. Bonferroni 
confidence interval adjustments and post-hoc analysis were used throughout. 
Accuracy  
The effects of age group (4-, vs. 6-, vs. 8-, vs., 10-, vs. adults), rotation angle (0 vs. 30 
vs. 60 vs. 90 vs. 120 vs. 150 vs. 180), and direction condition (congruent vs. incongruent) on 
mean accuracy (range 0 to 1 fully accurate) were examined in a mixed ANOVA where age 
group was the between participants variable. Accuracy increased with age, F(4, 107) = 20.03, 
p < .001, ηp² = .43. Four-year-olds (M = .68) were less accurate than all older age groups (all 
ps < .01). Six- year-olds (M = .82) were also less accurate than all older age groups (all ps < 
.02). There was no difference in accuracy between 8-year-olds (M = .92), 10-year-olds (M = 
.97) and adults (M = .96), all ps > .15. Overall, accuracy decreased with increasing rotation 
angle, F(6, 642) = 9.32, p < .001, ηp² = .08. Moreover, there was an age group x angle 
interaction, F(24, 642) = 4.06, p < .001, ηp² = .13. Post-hoc analyses revealed that only 4-
year-olds showed a significant diminution in accuracy with increasing angle (p < .001). All 
older age groups did not show a significant decrease in accuracy with increasing angle (all ps 
> .05). 
For congruency of the fall, participants were equally accurate whether the direction of 
potential fall was congruent or incongruent with the direction of rotation, F(1, 642) = .51, p = 
.48, ηp² = .01, and this was the case for all age groups as indicated by the non-significant 
interaction, F(4, 642) = 1.07, p = .37, ηp² = .04 (Table 1). Furthermore, there was no rotation 
direction x angle interaction, F(6, 642) = 1.18, p = .31, ηp² = .01.  
(Table 1 about here) 
Response times  
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To examine the effects of age, angle, and direction of fall on response times, only 
participants who performed significantly above chance (p < .05) were included (at least 19 
out of 28 trials correct for child participants; at least 35 correct out of 56 trials for adult 
participants) (Binomial-test). In total 95 out of 112 participants met this criterion (8 out of 17 
4-year-olds, 25 out of 31 6-year-olds, 14 out of 16 8-year-olds, all 10-year-olds and adults). 
However, the same findings emerged when all participants were included, and above chance 
performance was observed for each of the ages as an overall group (all ps < .001). 
Outlier trials for each age group, those greater than twice the median response time 
per angle, were excluded (4-year-olds: 6.7% of all trials, 6-year-ols: 4.5%; 8-year-olds: 3.3%; 
10-year-olds: 2.9%, adults: 1.5%).  
0˚ Trials. To examine the stimulus encoding and comparison time between direction 
condition (congruent versus incongruent) and across age groups when stimuli were unrotated, 
mean response times of correctly solved 0˚ trials were submitted to a mixed Linear Model 
based on maximum likelihood method.  
Mean response times decreased with increasing age, F(4, 175) = 60.15, p < .001. 
Adults’ (M = 117ms) encoding and comparison time was faster (p < .001) than all child age 
groups (10-year-olds: M = 2018ms; 8-year-olds: M = 2698ms; 6-year-olds: M = 3064ms; 4-
year-olds: M = 2984). Ten-year-olds were also faster than all younger age groups (p < .001), 
and 8-year-olds were faster than 6-year-ols (p < .05) but did not differ from 4-year-olds (p = 
.18). The youngest two age groups did not differ (p = .68). Further, participants responded 
more quickly in congruent trials (when the stimulus on the table appeared falling towards the 
comparison stimulus) (M = 2184ms) than in incongruent trials (M = 2589ms), F(1, 175) = 
14.24, p < .001. However, this effect was due to 6- and 8-year-olds who took longer to 
respond on incongruent 0˚ trials (p < .001) whereas the remaining age groups showed no 
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difference in response times on congruent and incongruent 0˚ trials (all ps > .18), shown by 
the age group x direction interaction, F(4, 175) = 6.17, p < .001 (Figure 2).  
Congruent versus incongruent response times. The effects of age group (4-, vs. 6-, 
vs. 8-, vs., 10-, vs. adults), angle (30 vs. 60 vs. 90 vs. 120 vs. 150 vs. 180), and direction 
(congruent vs. incongruent) on mean response times of trials solved correctly, were examined 
in a Linear Mixed Model based on maximum likelihood method. For a results overview see 
Figure 2.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
Response times decreased with increasing age, F(4, 1049) = 221.047, p < .001. 
Decreases occurred between all adjacent age groups (all ps < .001) (adults: M = 1630ms; 10-
year-olds: M = 2244ms; 8-year-olds: M = 2287ms) except between 6- (M = 3256ms) and 4-
year-olds (M = 3270ms) who did not differ (p = .87). Additionally, response times increased 
with increasing rotation angle, F(5, 1049) = 9.34, p < .001. Response times differed between 
all rotation angle pairs (all ps < .01) except between 30˚-90˚, and 120˚-180˚ (ps > .06).  
These main effects were qualified by an age x angle interaction, F(20, 1049) = 2.65, p 
< .001. To interpret this interaction, we examined which ages showed a linear increase in 
response times of accurate trials with increasing angles. The best-fitting linear function was 
calculated by the method-of-least-squares within each age group separately for participants 
who performed significantly above chance. Response times increased linearly with increasing 
angle for most age groups: 6-year-olds, R2 = .03, F(1, 284) = 9.47, p = .002; 10-year-olds, R2 
= .06, F(1, 285) = 16.50, p < .001; and adults, R2 = .63, F(1, 286) = 184.17, p < .001. Both, 4-
year-olds and 8-year-olds, however, did not show a significant linear increase in response 
times with angle: R2 = .02, F(1, 89) = .1.72, p = .19; R2 = .01, F(1, 160) = .02, p = .89, 
respectively. The lack of linear increase in 8-year-olds is hard to explain but closer inspection 
of Figure 2 reveals large variation of response times on individual stimulus orientations.   
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Moreover, response times were longer in incongruent directions (when the table 
potentially fell away from the direction of rotation of the monkey) (M = 2707ms) compared 
with congruent ones (M = 2487ms), F(1, 1049) = 21.35, p < .001.  However, this was not the 
case for all age groups: the age group x fall direction interaction was significant, F(4, 1049) = 
4.75, p < .001. Neither 4-year-olds’ nor adults’ response times differed for fall direction (ps > 
.79). In contrast, all intermediate age groups, 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds, took longer to respond 
on incongruent than on congruent trials (all ps < .04) (Table 1). There were no further 
interactions.  
Discussion 
The current aim was to provide novel insights into the conceptual penetrability of 
children’s mental rotation processes. Two main findings emerged. First, 6-year-old children’s 
but not 4-year-olds’ response times for rotated stimuli increased linearly with increasing 
rotation angle, consistent with previous mental rotation research (Estes, 1998; Frick, Ferrera, 
& Newcombe, 2013; Frick, et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005; Kosslyn et al., 1990; Marmor, 
1975). This suggests that mental images are quasi-pictorial in format at age 6: children 
preserve spatial relations in their mental images. Four-year-old children did not show this 
effect, however fewer than half the children this age group performed above chance. Thus, 4-
year-olds might have been guessing and not, in fact, mentally rotating. The drop in accuracy 
with increasing rotation angle supports this supposition and indicates that the task was too 
difficult for them. Moreover, the remaining sample, once those who performed below chance 
were excluded, left only eight 4-year-old children the analysis; even if these children 
mentally rotated the sample may have lacked power to detect an effect. Although the majority 
of 8-year-olds performed above chance (14 out of 16), they also did not reveal a linear 
increase in response times with rotation angle. However, closer inspection of Figure 2 reveals 
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great variation of response times at different angles and this age group also had a small 
sample size (N = 14). Thus the sample may have suffered from low power.   
The second novel key finding is that 6-, 8-, and 10-year-olds took longer to rotate 
stimuli when the direction of rotation of the monkey on the right hand side was incongruent 
with the potential direction of fall of the monkey on the left hand side. Thus, between 6 and 
10 years of age children’s mental rotation performance varied with conceptual information 
concerning the effect of gravity on the monkey on the left. In contrast, adults’ response times 
of rotated stimuli did not differ with the congruency of the potential direction of fall, 
suggesting no effects of conceptual penetrability on mental rotation.   
This pattern of conceptual penetrability is in line with previous research on 
interference of motor processes on mental rotation (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005). 
Taken together, the findings suggest that mental and motor processes become increasingly 
differentiated with increasing age. In line with this notion, current findings indicate that 6- 
and 10-year-olds,’ but not adults,’ mental rotation processes are cognitively penetrable. With 
increasing age, mental rotation processes not only become increasingly differentiated from 
motor processes (Frick et al., 2009; Funk et al., 2005) but also from top-down processes 
(current findings). This raises the possibility that mental rotation performance in childhood is 
supported both by sensorimotor processes and by conceptual processes. However, it should 
be noted that the current findings examined kinetic mental rotation. Further research should 
investigate whether this also extends to visuo-spatial rotation of objects (see e.g., Kosslyn et 
al., 1998). Moreover, including a more balanced gender adult sample might be preferable 
since there are well documented advantages for males in mental rotation tasks (Collins & 
Kimura, 1997; Palermo, Iaria, & Guariglia, 2008; Voyer, Voyer, & Bryden, 1995) that may 
also elicit differences in cognitive penetrability. 
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The question further arises whether findings reflect top-down influences on mental 
rotation performance, or could be explained by bottom-up sensorimotor representations, that 
is, representational momentum (Freyd & Finke, 1984). The typical effect is that the 
anticipation of a moving stimulus’ end position is exaggerated in direction of the stimuli’s 
anticipated motion (Freyd & Finke, 1984). Representational momentum for moving stimuli is 
already present in 2-year-olds (Perry, Smith, & Hockema, 2008), and the effect is larger in 5-
8-year-olds than in adults (Hubbard, Matzenbacher, & Davis, 1999). For static stimuli the 
effect of representational momentum is equally pronounced in 8-, 10-year-olds and adults 
(e.g., remembering a photograph of someone walking as further along) (Futterweit & Beilin, 
1994). Given that the current findings revealed less of an effect in adults and differences 
between 10-year-olds and adults, the current data do not fit well with a representational 
momentum explanation.  
However, the finding that 6- and 8-year-olds showed different response times for 
congruent and incongruent trials under no rotation raises the possibility that their congruency 
effects for rotated stimuli were a result of decreased attention in incongruent trials away from 
the comparison stimulus, rather than reflecting top-down influences on mental rotation. If so 
then we would expect lower accuracy in these trials, which was not the case. Rather, findings 
suggest that at age 6 children’s mental images are depictive, as shown by their linear increase 
in response times with increasing angle, and their mental rotation performance is influenced 
by conceptual factors. Overall, this indicates an early reliance on the perceptual properties of 
images, with children spontaneously utilising conceptual information to guide their mental 
imagery. This finding adds to earlier work by Estes (1998), who reported that by age 6, 
children were similar to adults in demonstrating conscious awareness of the process of 
imaging the rotation path of a visual image. Four-year-olds, by contrast, were poorer at 
describing the mental process of rotation, thus indicating less metacognitive awareness in the 
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process of mental rotation. An insight into one’s own mental states may be necessary in order 
for mental imagery performance to be conceptually penetrated. 
In sum, children’s mental rotation performance can be penetrated by top-down 
knowledge and this effect decreases with age. The developmental approach taken here 
provides novel insights into the emergence of the effects of top-down knowledge on mental 
rotation performance and the depictive nature of mental images.  
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Table 1. 
Mean accuracy and response times (ms) of accurate trials from participants who performed 
significantly (p < .05) above chance (standard deviation in parenthesis) as a function of 
rotation direction (excluding 0˚). 
  4-year-olds 6-year-olds 8-year-olds 10-year-olds Adults 
Congruent Accuracy .71 
(.16) 
.81 
(.20) 
.91 
(.20) 
.97 
(.05) 
.96 
(.06) 
 Response 
Times 
3238 
(667) 
3095 
(952) 
2303 
(496) 
2169 
(618) 
1622 
(511) 
Incongruent Accuracy .66 
(.14) 
.83 
(.16) 
.91 
(.14) 
.97 
(.05) 
.95 
(.05) 
 Response 
Times 
3283  
(889) 
3418 
(1040) 
2874 
(937) 
2319 
(597) 
1634 
(566) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Stimuli pairs examples (from top left clockwise): Incongruent direction, both 
monkeys hold their left arms up, the monkey on the right is rotated 30˚: Incongruent- 
Left-Left_30, Congruent-Left-Left_30, Incongruent-Left-Right_30, Congruent-Left 
Right_30  
Figure 2. Mean response times and standard errors as a function of rotation angle, fall 
direction (congruent vs. incongruent) and age group.  
 
 
 
 
